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Preventing Bankruptcy and Transforming City Finances after
Hurricane Katrina
Andy Kopplin

In 2010, when the Landrieu administration took office in New Orleans, we inherited a financial
situation that the mayor compared to the massive oil spill occurring at that very time in the Gulf,
the worst in US history. The city was nearly bankrupt. Much of what we faced was the result of
factors—Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the subsequent failure of the federal levees, the great
recession—that were far from the prior administration of Mayor Ray Nagin’s control. Much was
the result of a culture of ineffectiveness and inefficiency that predated his administration. But much
was the result of gross mismanagement and corruption during his time in office, too.
When the public sector management expert David Osborne visited New Orleans in 2010 at
our request to assess the situation, he said: “I just haven’t run into this level of dysfunction before,
and I’ve been doing this work for almost 25 years.” He noted it was the most corrupt city
government he had ever seen.1
So we faced both natural and man-made disasters—ones that wiped out our resources and
nearly washed our city away. We knew that New Orleans could come back stronger than ever
before, but it was hardly obvious that she would. This would be incredibly hard work, but Mayor
Mitch Landrieu was an inspiring leader and, as a team, we were committed to doing whatever was
required. I remember the moment Mayor Landrieu invited me to join him and his team as the first
deputy mayor and chief administrative officer. I was living in Baton Rouge at the time, and he sent
a text message that said simply, “Come help me rebuild a great American city.” With that, he
basically reached into my chest and pulled out my heart. I had previously served Governor
Kathleen Blanco as the executive director of her Louisiana Recovery Authority, in charge of
rebuilding the state after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. And I knew Mitch from our work together
in Baton Rouge when he was a legislator and later when he was lieutenant governor. This was
unfinished business for both of us.
I had been one of many who had urged Mitch to run for mayor in 2006. He ran but lost a close
election that year. So when he won in 2010, I could not say no. I was probably one of very few
people even more excited by his victory than by the New Orleans Saints’ winning their first Super
Bowl the day after his election.
Our entire team was moved and motivated. We knew that for New Orleans to thrive again,
our city finances had to turn around. Much of the joy of our city—the music, the arts, the food, the
culture, the sports—could not be sustained without the unglamorous work of preventing
bankruptcy and getting the city back on its feet. More important, though, lives depended on city
government working, and working well. Without a rebuilding of the city’s finances, critical public
safety and infrastructure needs would go unmet.
We were driven by the depth of the problems at hand. Two months into office, Mayor
Landrieu gave a State of the City speech titled “Eyes Wide Open.” In it, he made that oil spill
comparison and he charted the reality we faced. Our city was beautiful. Our city was resilient. Our
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city was also in grave financial trouble. When we came into office, he explained, we had been told
of a $35 million budget gap. As we had looked at the books in detail by then, we determined it was
really $67 million.2
“Like the spill,” Mayor Landrieu said, “it’s worse than we thought, and there are no quick
fixes.”
It only got worse after that. We found more bills to pay that former Mayor Nagin’s
administration had left behind. By the end of the year, we thought we had nailed down all of what
was knowable to a budget gap of about $80 million—more than double what we were initially
told. Unfortunately, there was still more to uncover. The team in charge of payroll projections for
the city made their projections in terms of when cash was required, rather than when expenses
were accrued. They were not accountants and did not recognize that payroll costs would accrue to
the period when employees worked in 2010, rather than when they got paid for those hours in
2011.
These costs expanded our gap to $97 million for the year 2010,3 most of which we closed
through cuts, applying an undesignated insurance payment and increasing collections in key areas.
But this last mistake we found too late to solve in 2010, which put us in a deficit posture to end
the fiscal year.
Since Hurricane Katrina, the city had often submitted audits late; three out of the five
comprehensive annual financial reports between 2005 and 2009 were not prepared on time.4 The
city’s 2009 audit was still unfinished when we came on board.5 Thus, we did not know right away
that the city was already in negative territory in its fund balance. And because we had overdrawn
our reserves, we were using next month’s revenues to pay bills from months earlier. The 2010
deficit just added to the challenges. But without our determined actions, the city would have found
itself insolvent and may not have had advance warning to even know the end was near.
That we had reached a negative fund balance was painful to imagine. When Katrina hit, the
city had nearly $70 million in reserve and then received $240 million in FEMA loans that were
forwarded to us by the state.6 Mayor Nagin’s administration had spent all of this money and then
some. Though those funds were essential to begin to recover and repair our city, it was
irresponsible not to track those expenditures, recognize when the money would run out, and make
a plan for replacing it in the budget.
To make matters worse, we had to pay $170 million to JP Morgan Chase for bonds that had
been called because of the financial crisis in 2008 and a poor financial decision the city had made
to do an unnecessarily risky bond transaction eight years earlier. We needed to pay them all back
by 2013, along with a substantial termination payment.7 The city was again looking squarely in
the eyes of bankruptcy. We had overspent our reserves. Our recurring revenues were still smaller
than our recurring expenses. Who was going to lend us money? We had to fix it—and fix it quickly.
We continued to uncover problems; they were numerous and serious. Some departments were
overspending personnel budgets by 20 percent.8 Our general ledger system was out of date and
operated on a mainframe computer system.9 The payroll system was decades old and no longer
supported by the vendor. The only person who knew how to fix it had returned home to India; we
contracted with him to maintain and fix it when it broke, which was often. Every week, when
payroll hit, we were on the verge of a catastrophe; there was always the chance that more than four
thousand employees would go without a paycheck. Our new city attorney arrived to a backlog of
two hundred contracts to approve, all of which contained some sort of error. The Police
Department was scheduled to run out of money in October.10 Their approved 2010 budget, like the
city’s at large, was not paid for. Estimates for what payroll and overtime would cost were
2
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inaccurate. Additionally, the Nagin administration and city council had passed a budget that
included a cut of nearly one-third in the more than $50 million health insurance program for city
employees without announcing it publicly or even telling even the staff running the program.11
The city was also facing an incredible $200 million legal judgment for back pay and interest
to firefighters dating from the 1970s.12 Simultaneously, we were facing dramatic increases in
firefighter pension because of an equally incredible set of state legislative and firefighter pension
fund management decisions. The fund itself was terribly managed, leaving it just 12 percent funded
in 2014.13 It was also irresponsibly invested. Significant investments had been made in speculative
local real estate deals, including a failing golf course. Individual contributions were too small, and
no contributions were required at all from firefighters with twenty years of service or more—the
ones whose benefits were growing the most.14
We also faced potentially catastrophically expensive civil litigation from the United States
Department of Justice regarding unconstitutional practices at the New Orleans Police Department
(NOPD) and the Orleans Parish Prison. Our community had been calling for reforms here, and
they were right to do so. In 2010, Mayor Landrieu had invited the Department of Justice to
investigate NOPD practices and civil rights violations, and in 2011, the Department of Justice
issued a written report about their concerns, and alleging unconstitutional practices.15 Fixing these
problems would require money we would be hard pressed to find, but we knew that doing so would
make our city safer, more fair, and more just.
In addition to the investigation into the NOPD, a complaint had been filed against the Orleans
Parish Sheriff’s Office.16 The Department of Justice followed up with an investigation and report
finding grave injustice and mistreatment in the Orleans Parish Prison.17 The Sheriff’s Office filed
a complaint against the City of New Orleans, calling it responsible for providing the funding they
would need in order to make changes. Then, the Sheriff’s Office moved for a proposed consent
judgment with the plaintiffs and the United States Government.18 Without dramatic changes in the
overall size of the jail—including the sheriff’s practice of holding thousands of state prisoners—
this consent decree would require extraordinary amounts from the city; we had already budgeted
around $20 million for the jail,19 but the Sheriff’s Office was requesting more than $60 million to
comply.20 We needed a seat at the decision-making table. As with the firefighter pension fund, the
city had no control over management of the jail, but we were expected to pay for the overwhelming
majority of additional financial requirements of the proposed consent judgment. For these consent
decrees, we also had federal judges who could seize our bank accounts to extract payments.
For the consent decree for the NOPD, we estimated that we would need to pay $55 million
over five years.21 The Orleans Parish Prison Consent Decree could have cost at least another $40
million annually beyond the funding we already provided for the prison.22 This was money we did
not have.
Even as we became aware of these issues, we did not truly know how bad it was, because the
city had not been reconciling its books every thirty days as it should have been. The finance
department was almost a year behind. There was no system for forecasting expenditures, and the
City’s Revenue Estimating Conference had neither been meeting regularly nor scrutinizing the
revenue projections with any rigor. What revenues they had budgeted were often speculative. For
example, they included an anticipated $1.6 million from a proposed new program to ticket braketag violators,23 but the Department of Public Works never implemented an enforcement program.
It would have been impossible. Ticket writers did not have the capacity to write brake-tag tickets
on the machines they had at the time. Even if they had had it, their efforts would not have generated
much revenue, because there were too few ticket writers to complete the work at hand, and they
3
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were using nearly all of their available capacity on the more lucrative task of writing parking
tickets.
Money was also being wasted in striking ways. The city had paid more than $50,000 to store
$70,000 of furniture that was never used. They were set to pay $11,000 for an educational program
for someone who was no longer a City Hall employee. Contractors were hired who failed time and
time again. In Armstrong Park, simple tasks like pouring concrete had to be redone multiple times.
Contractors not only did poor work but harmed the park they were fixing, damaging trees and
curbs and even a statue of Louis Armstrong himself.24
The Osborne report had noted the need to reform civil service rules; our system was fifty years
out of date. Government job classifications were muddled, and that meant it was difficult for
managers to promote or give raises when appropriate. It was also difficult to fire people for poor
performance, so employees stayed for years in jobs they did not do well. Hiring was also too slow,
and recruitment was inefficient. The city practiced “bumping,” through which someone whose job
is eliminated can then take a job from someone with less tenure.25
The citizens of New Orleans knew things were bad; after all, they were paying almost a third
of their property taxes for interest on city debt alone. In 2009, the year before we took office, 72
percent of residents felt their “city government was worse than others,” and 61 percent felt there
was “a lot of corruption in city government.”26
The city’s struggles were easy for them to see; basic functions of government infrastructure
had failed. In May 2010, when we stepped into office, nearly a third of streetlights in New Orleans
were out.27 Pavement was riddled with potholes. Fifty-five thousand properties were blighted and
27 percent of homes were still unoccupied. City Hall itself had been without hot water for two
years. Less than half of the city’s crime cameras were working and there was no maintenance
budget to repair them.28 Poor finances meant poor infrastructure; New Orleans was in disrepair.
Action: Careful, Strategic, Data-Driven Change
That was the world we walked into. We knew we had to make drastic changes to get out of the
hole we were in. We needed to fill a budget gap that represented 25 percent of the approved budget
in just six months.29 We did so thoughtfully, strategically, and with conviction. First, we froze
hiring and nonessential spending. We conducted assessments, internally and with external support,
to identify our next steps. Then, we set out guiding principles to anchor our work. We used timetested best practices of fiscal responsibility and accountability. We used data to determine and
track what would have the biggest impact. We made significant cuts in spending, and we found
ways to increase short-term and long-term revenue through the work of a dedicated group of
internal consultants we called the Innovation Team, led by our chief information and innovation
officer, Allen Square, who put his background in business consulting to work finding efficiencies
and opportunities to generate new revenues. Throughout it all, we committed to the idea that we
owed it to our city to make hard decisions. That was our duty as a government—to make the
smartest, most strategic choices with the sorely limited time and resources we had.
Taking Stock and Looking Forward
When we stepped into City Hall in May 2010, we knew part of our work was fully assessing the
depth of the problems we faced. We would learn to our dismay that the $35 million deficit we had
been told about was closer to $100 million. Beyond that, though, we had to understand the reasons
behind the deficit, and the other results of mismanagement we stepped into. We needed to unearth
the many granular failures behind the larger, more visible ones.
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This undertaking took expertise and honesty. Norman Foster, our chief financial officer, who had
held senior financial leadership positions in the Iowa and Minnesota state governments, did the
necessary, thankless work of asking tough questions of teams across City Hall and demanding
proof in answers. We also requested the advice of outside experts such as David Osborne of the
Public Strategy Group and his team. We raised the money to pay these experts from generous local
groups determined to help New Orleans get back on its feet, including Baptist Community
Ministries, the Business Council of New Orleans and the River Region, Loyola University, the
RosaMary Foundation, Tulane University, and the Urban League of Greater New Orleans.30 This
collaboration spoke to the urgency with which citizens and local institutions sought change;
Osborne’s team took their charge seriously. They interviewed city employees, residents,
customers, and local civic and business leaders. They met with government leaders and analyzed
background readings.
The report they produced was thorough and sobering; we used it as a guide. Osborne’s team
pinpointed where things had gone wrong and analyzed where and how we should start making
change. The report set out a plan for improvement that included ways to cut costs, take in revenue,
track performance, reform contracting, and track blight. These ideas would serve as a blueprint as
we planned the ways we would turn city government around.
To do this hard work, we came together around our shared dreams. We anchored ourselves
with a city vision, mission, and set of values, as well as six concrete priorities. Our vision was
“With resilience, we transform challenges into instruments of progress with the belief and
assurance that change is possible.” Our mission was “The City of New Orleans delivers excellent
services to its citizens with courage, competence and compassion.” Our values declared, “We are
committed to serving the citizens of New Orleans, not ourselves. We are honest and trustworthy.”
The need for this organizational value would later be made more obvious following the convictions
of Mayor Nagin and one of his top deputies for corrupt actions they took while serving in positions
of public trust. Our six priority areas were public safety, enhanced well-being of children and
families, economic development, sustainable communities, open and effective government, and
innovation. Within each priority area, we set outcome measures. When it came to finances, these
measures included the city’s bond ratings and the level of funding in our reserve accounts. We
knew that if we were going to make change, we had to be grounded in the same guiding purpose
and held accountable to the same results.
Making Budget Cuts and Hard Choices
Right away, much of our work involved budget cuts. We held fast to Mayor Landrieu’s refrain that
we “had to do the hard thing for the sake of doing what is right.” It was impossible to avoid making
cuts that hurt. So we stayed clear-eyed and focused, choosing the cuts that hurt the least and helped
the most. We had no real choice; our only alternative was bankruptcy.
This choice meant, for example, furloughing city employees for eleven days in 2010.31 That
meant everyone from police officers to firefighters to the health department to the mayor himself
would lose almost half a month’s pay before the end of the year. Classified employees got those
days off. Those of us in unclassified leadership positions worked through the furlough days trying
to put the city back together again. These furloughs were the most difficult cuts we had to make,
because the city employees being harmed were, with few exceptions, not the cause of the problems.
But they prevented us from having to make massive layoffs instead. In addition, we cut overtime
dramatically and virtually eliminated travel costs across government.
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We also made the necessary, but deeply unpopular choice, to freeze hiring across the city except
for revenue-producing positions. This hiring freeze included the police department, which
represented nearly a quarter of the city’s expenditures each year.32 By June 2010, a month into our
time in office, the police department had spent almost four times what they had been allocated for
the entire year’s overtime pay.33 Even so, in all eight years of the Landrieu administration, we
never cut police funding. Instead, we increased funding for the NOPD every year we were in office.
We managed this combination of increased funding alongside the two-year hiring freeze with care.
The NOPD was budgeted for only ten months of 2010, so we added money to get through our first
year and budgeted increased funding every year after. That funding included massive increases in
retirement spending, new vehicles, new technology, body-worn cameras, pay raises, new recruit
classes, and another $55 million over five years to pay for the costs of the department’s federal
consent decree.34
We dramatically pared down and renegotiated our vendor contracts. If it was not “on fire or
bleeding,” we did not fund it. We ended contracts that were not about life or safety. We
renegotiated every one of the city’s three trash pick-up contracts and cut a better deal with the
landfill for our dumping fees. We cut contracts for lawn-mowing on the city’s medians, which we
call neutral grounds in New Orleans.
Though it was controversial, we also started pushing back on the firefighters’ backpay case
and pension funds; we wanted responsible changes in their investment practices, contributions,
and benefits. Because the rules for the fund were set by the state, all we had to negotiate with was
our wallet. We made the decision to stop paying into the firefighter pension fund until the
legislature changed the board’s structure and investment practices and adjusted the firefighters’
retirement contributions and benefits levels to ones more comparable with other jurisdictions. In
response to this action, a New Orleans judge ordered the city to pay, but Mayor Landrieu held
firm—even in the face of potential jail time over a contempt judgment from one local court.35 We
created a working group to review the problem at hand, which included members of city
government, business leaders, pension fund experts, and firefighters’ representatives.
We pushed aggressively to have a major role in creating change at the jail, because its size
and management practices influenced not only how much New Orleans taxpayers would have to
pay but the level of justice in our community. First, we knew we needed to reduce the number of
nonviolent pretrial detainees in the jail and get out of the practice of housing state inmates, so we
suggested reforms to move toward those outcomes. We also knew that to improve conditions it
was important to invest more into the jail, even as the population was declining. Amid all this, we
were well aware that any new funds could go to waste without real reforms in management and
efficiency.36
Enacting Sound Fiscal Wisdom
Coming into a situation so out of control meant returning to basic principles of fiscal wisdom. The
city would now use recurring revenues for recurring expenses, and one-time revenues for one-time
expenses. These steps would lead us to create structural balance in our budget. We budgeted for
outcomes rather than simply funding what had been funded before. We audited the utility and
necessity of our government programs and funded the ones that worked. We maintained hiring
freezes where we needed to and carefully managed choices around personnel. With over a dozen
separate departments and many more boards and commissions, we needed to impose executive
control. No department could make a hire or promotion or give a raise without my signature in
blue ink on the civil service form. No purchase could be made without my approval.
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We went through our budgets methodically, stretching where we could and analyzing constantly.
We went painstakingly through payroll. We made sure we were managing overtime and avoiding
the previous administration’s mistake of doing their projections in cash rather than accrual. If a
program was failing to perform, or if revenue was dropping, we knew we had to cut it. We
consolidated government agencies, boards, and commissions where we could, eliminating overlap,
saving money, and increasing effectiveness. We carefully triaged how we released checks. Every
week, Norman Foster and I would sit down and plan the order in which we would pay our bills
that week. If we had a sixty-day grace period on paying a vendor, we waited all sixty days.
We also reworked the systems that managed all these processes. The city’s basic operations
had languished; we sought order and efficiency to get city finances back on track and able to fund
the important work of government. We updated systems that relied on paper records. After a
request for proposals and a review, we outsourced payroll services to a leading company in the
field.
As we made these cuts, we engaged our community. This effort generated valuable input and
helped expand public understanding for the decisions we made. Mayor Landrieu held public
budget meetings in each council district every year to get our citizens’ views on how New Orleans
spends money, runs city operations, and takes care of its people. These meetings included city
council members, the police and fire superintendents, and all other department leaders.37
We enacted civil service reforms that made our city more efficient and allowed for talented
city employees to make an even greater impact on New Orleans. We created sixteen commander
positions at the NOPD, enabling Chief Ronal Serpas to pull high-performing officers from across
the department and put them into leadership roles, such as running districts or divisions, on a
temporary, at-will basis. This opportunity to get new talent to the top meant that officers could rise
to leadership on the basis of their skills and exceptional past performance rather than their rank
and the number of years they had served.38
Later on, our Innovation Team led the effort to pass the Great Place to Work initiative, which
implemented reforms such as merit-based raises, flexibility on hiring and promotions, and
delegation of hiring authority to departments.39 These shifts had been recommended to us by the
Bureau of Governmental Research and the Business Council of New Orleans and the River Region,
among others; now, we finally put them into place.
Using Data to Track Problems and Progress
We did not have room for error. We knew that city governments and police departments
nationwide were using performance measurement systems and data tracking to improve outcomes.
The flagship program was the New York City Police Department’s Compstat program, through
which the department tracked crime statistics and met frequently to track patterns and determine
plans of actions. The program was launched in 1994. Between 1993 and 1998, burglaries and
robberies dropped more than 50 percent, and homicides were down 67 percent.40 In 2000,
Baltimore followed with a similar program, CitiStat, that tracked not just police but other civic
concerns, eventually healthcare and education.41
It was clear New Orleans needed such programs, too. We created the Office of Performance
and Accountability, our version of CitiStat, which we dubbed NOLAStat, and the ResultsNOLA
report, which would track our progress (or lack thereof) and make it public. Oliver Wise, our
relentless director of performance and accountability, focused on “what’s working, what’s not, and
how to fix it.” On an internal level, we began carefully tracking fiscal performance data,
particularly revenue collections and expenditures. We called this BottomLineStat. To monitor our
7
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citywide work of responding to reports of blight and to performance manage our efforts to
remediate it, we launched BlightStat. We also created QualityofLifeStat, which measured the
responsiveness of departments such as Sanitation, Safety and Permits, and Public Works.
QualityofLifeStat also notably included the NOPD’s Quality of Life officers in the conversation,
since they were often the first point of contact for citizens. When they could help solve a qualityof-life issue in their district, it bolstered trust in the NOPD and the credibility of city government.
ReqtoCheck tracked the processes of contracting, from requisition to payment.
These programs would streamline processes, eliminate backlogs, unstick what had gotten
stuck in bureaucracy, solve problems, fix systems that were not working, and make us more
efficient. They would also help create the conditions for economic growth and increased tax
revenue.42
Finding New Sources of Revenue
In addition to our cuts and analyses, we sought new ways to generate money for the city, inspiring
Mayor Landrieu to call our strategy “cutting smart, reorganizing, and investing for growth.” For
example, we hired more tax auditors and collectors. Notably, in our first summer in office, we
seized and auctioned a Bentley from the owner of a local bar who was not paying his sales taxes.43
Businesses learned there were consequences when they didn’t pay their sales taxes; taxpayer
compliance, and in turn, revenues, increased. We also hired more parking ticket writers. We
realized parking violators had not been consistently fined for illegal parking. Sometimes their cars
caused a safety hazard, but often they were simply not paying for parking in metered spots—it had
become citywide knowledge that people rarely faced consequences for unpaid traffic tickets. Even
those tickets that had been issued previously were not being effectively collected, so we took
action. We began booting vehicles that had unpaid parking or traffic camera tickets; we found that
nearly half of those boots went to violators from out of town or state. We noticed that fleet
companies, like FedEx and UPS, had tens of thousands dollars of unpaid tickets. Now, we followed
up with them to get the money the city was owed.
We set the stage for future revenue, too. We took action to make the city more welcoming to
business, trade, and tourism. We knew that by making New Orleans a better place to live, displaced
residents would return, homeownership and home values would rise, and good conditions for
additional investment would result. The fact that nearly a third of streetlights were out was
unacceptable and would discourage people from moving to those neighborhoods and to streets that
were not lit up at night. So we doubled the number of work crews on the project and assigned those
crews thirteen-hour days, six days a week. We also found $8 million in federal recovery dollars to
help fund the work.44
We invested in repairing roads, pipes, potholes, libraries, and school buildings. We
reintroduced the city’s 311 call center, with a new software system that would track requests and
monitor customer service. We set up the “One Stop Shop” for all city permitting on the seventh
floor of City Hall. Performance data from the “One Stop Shop” and 311 was monitored in
QualityofLifeStat. Our close accounting enabled us to find and manage the money to do these
things, and we knew it would result in more money for the city down the line.
In 2013, we set out ProsperityNOLA, a plan for building more revenue through economic
growth. We focused on industries and opportunities, such as advanced manufacturing and
information technology, as well as logistics around transportation and trade. We landed a major
IT job expansion from GE Capital. Projects like building a brand new billion-dollar terminal for
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the Armstrong International Airport and leasing the World Trade Center for a Four Seasons hotel
downtown would bring about new revenue later on and spur new retail development.

Hard-Won, Steady Success: A City Gets Back On Its Feet
As we took action, we saw progress. It was not overnight. For my first few years, it seemed that
every time I stepped into the mayor’s office, I had to announce bad news. But we were making
shifts and reforms, and as we went, we saw results. By 2013, we had balanced the budget and
successfully refinanced the JP Morgan bonds. It was one of the best fiscal turnarounds in the
country. That year, we finished in the black for the first time since 2008, with a positive fund
balance of $8.3 million. By 2015, we had gone from that $97 million budget gap and a negative
fund balance of around $20 million to having nearly $70 million in reserves—meeting the bestpractice standard of having 10 percent of the city’s operating budget in reserves. By the time I left
city government, our budget was structurally balanced and had grown by $72 million in four years,
largely because of new sales and property tax revenues.45
Our credit rating improved to the highest in the history of the city.46 This rating was the result
of many factors, such as the expansion of commercial retail and the increased tax revenue it
allowed us to collect, our city’s strong financial management, and budgetary flexibility. This credit
rating, in turn, allowed us more funding for city projects.
The city still had work to do by the time we left office, even with our newfound financial
stability. Because of the mayor’s commitment to grow the NOPD as quickly as we could, alongside
the costs of the consent decrees and firefighter and police pension funds, much of our city’s new
revenue was spent on public safety. This left city infrastructure as the highest remaining urgent
funding challenge for our successors.
Wise Choices Pay Off
We stuck to our guns and held firm, and after more than a year of mediation and lots of help from
the Business Council of New Orleans and the River Region, we reached a settlement with the
firefighters. It established a payment plan from the City of New Orleans to settle the firefighters’
backpay issue. It also provided a structural fix for the pension fund by increasing contributions
from the city, increasing contributions from the firefighters, decreasing retirement benefits,
changing the board’s membership, and putting a number of restrictions on the way the board
managed their investments. The firefighters’ pension fund and backpay litigation had been longstanding impediments to creating fiscal stability for the city; now, we could move forward. In
addition to ending both legal conflicts, we estimated the settlement would save us $275 million
over the next three decades.47
Our civil service reforms also garnered success. The two police chiefs that followed Chief
Serpas—Chief Michael Harrison and Chief Shaun Ferguson—gained the experience they needed
for that role through the opportunities our reforms provided. The reforms gave them the chance to
serve as commanders, gaining operations management experience as well as exposure to the most
significant leadership, management and policing issues facing the NOPD. This experience helped
prepare them for the leadership opportunity that followed.
When it came to our disagreements with the Sheriffs’ Office, we finally reached solid ground.
Through the mediation of magistrate judge Michael North, we succeeded in securing a settlement
that dramatically reduced the size of the jail and reserved it for local pretrial detainees, while
excluding most state prisoners. This action significantly limited the worst-case scenarios of our
9
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cost projections, because they were proportional to the jail’s population. The costs to taxpayers of
these reforms were still significant—nearly $30 million more annually in recent years48—but they
were kept from being much higher because of our efforts. Importantly, these shifts brought down
the number of people that were held in our jail unnecessarily; we had more than six thousand
people in jail in 2000, and by 2017, there were fewer than fifteen hundred.49
Growth in Infrastructure
Transforming finances and building efficiencies allowed for growth in infrastructure and civic
satisfaction. The data tracking structures we had in place worked quickly to promote change. Our
data programs, such as BlightStat, all had open, public meetings with department heads monthly.
In BottomLineStat meetings, for example, we looked into how many photo citation cameras were
working in school zones—these were most fundamentally a matter of safety but also an important
source of city revenue. It turned out that many of these cameras were taking photos, but the lights
set to blink during school entry and exit hours were broken, so we could not issue a ticket. Over a
series of meetings, we figured out why and set clear plans to fix those lights.
With the city financially stable again, we could invest in critical projects that we had had to
set to the side earlier. By the time Mayor Landrieu left office, we had filled more than two hundred
thousand potholes, expanded bike paths to 110 miles, built a new hospital in Eastern New Orleans,
built new or repaired police and fire stations in every neighborhood across the city, opened five
new regional libraries, secured a federal grant to build a new Loyola Avenue streetcar line,50 and
spent more than $160 million in rebuilding our parks and playgrounds.51 We expanded public
transportation and began rebuilding our ferry terminal.52
These conditions for investments all paid off. Costco came to the city, creating jobs and, most
important, new sales tax revenue, as did the Mid City Market, the Magnolia Marketplace in Central
City, and the completely renovated Riverwalk downtown. New and renovated hotels and
apartment buildings were opening one after the next in the Central Business District. New Orleans
was much more sought after as a place to work, live, and visit, and we had a $6 billion building
boom.53 The shifts required to spur such investment had been paid for by responsible governmental
practices, and they set the stage for even more revenue to come.
Stronger Systems Brought Strong Results
BottomLineStat had helped fix our traffic cameras, and other such programs were working, too.
Our community became very involved in this process of data, input, and change; BlightStat
meetings were the most popular. Citizens held us to account, letting us know about gaps in our
systems and where our data did not match their experiences. When our staff reported that each
new case of blight was investigated within thirty days, citizens attending the meeting interrupted
us, declaring that we were wrong. We looked into the matter, and they were correct; it was taking
an average of thirty days, meaning some addresses were still languishing in the queue waiting for
an inspection. We responded by changing the way we tracked blight cases and doing what we had
said we would do in the first place. By measuring performance, we changed behavior. Blight
inspectors increased their productivity nearly fivefold,54 and we reduced blight by over fifteen
thousand units by 2017, going from the most blighted city in the United States when we took office
to the city reducing blight the fastest.55
By using data and outcomes to drive decisions, we made better choices about how to use our
money, and how we could make more. By tracking contracts, we cut the time of procurement from
six months to just over one month. Our city services were more efficient, too; our 311 hold time
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went from roughly a minute in the fall of 2012 to four seconds in January 2015.56 Our government
became more efficient and effective while managing and making the most of our money.
Lessons Learned: Preserving Our City Required Hard Choices in Hard Times
The financial transformation we facilitated in New Orleans was not an act of magic. It was the
result of clear-eyed assessment, careful planning, hard choices, and focused action. In the work I
did alongside my team at City Hall, I relied on five principles, which I present here in the hope
that they will be helpful to other cities and regions looking to turn their finances around.
1. When finances are out of control, a government has to exert more internal authority and
control and return to basic fiscal discipline. It is important to act quickly. When something
is uncomfortable but necessary, delay does not make that discomfort go away—it simply
extends and amplifies it. I had to wield that blue pen, even though it meant giving my teams
less agency than I may have hoped for. We also had to make clear, prudent financial
choices, such as not spending nonrecurring money on recurring expenses.
2. Data and performance management matter, and they go together. City Stat programs work
because they provide the clarity required for precise, effective planning, and the
accountability to see those plans through. When New Orleans used data to plan for targeted,
outcomes-oriented action, we made better use of our resources and set the conditions for
investment, revenue, and better quality of life.
3. In times of crisis, fund only what is “on fire or bleeding.” We can allow the grass to go
uncut if it means our Emergency Medical Services can keep running.
4. Nobody tries to make a city go nearly bankrupt, but it happens. Well-meaning, smart people
in government can be engaged in a system of dysfunctional habits that are truly corrosive
to a city. They lose sight of fiscal discipline and spend money their city does not have. In
government, we cannot make everyone happy; we have to say no, make cuts, live within
our means, and enact change. We never spoke publicly about the threat of bankruptcy until
long after it had passed. It would have spooked the bond markets and undermined our
recovery. But the fear of it gave me many sleepless nights, all of which responsible
management would have avoided.
5. If one follows Mayor Landrieu’s advice to “do what is hard for the sake of doing what is
right,” change is possible. Even dire situations like the one we came into can be turned
around. A set of guiding principles, like our mission, vision, and values, can help city
employees stay aligned, focused, and inspired as they work together through even the
toughest moments.
I am proud to be a New Orleanian. Our city is stronger each day than it was the day before. It
helps that our government finances are back in order, and I am honored to share what I learned in
that process—but I am also reminded of what I learned from my colleagues and former teammates
at City Hall. The government employees I worked with showed me the best of their courage,
dedication, drive, innovation, and public spirit. They were there for the right reasons and, inspired
by Mayor Landrieu’s leadership, they demonstrated the true potential of city government.
Mayor Landrieu taught me about leadership, governing without fear, making hard choices,
and having an unyielding belief in our community. My neighbors remind me every day of the
importance of generosity, openness, and the power of a nod hello and a little critical feedback. Our
city’s students model hard work and big dreams; our business owners show relentless energy and
creativity. We can take lessons from civic leaders writing in journals, but in New Orleans, we learn
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from one another each day. As other cities and regions work to model our turnarounds and
successes, they should look to engage their communities as we did. These are all of our cities, after
all. In New Orleans, a popular t-shirt company prints shirts and stickers with the phrase, “Listen
to your City!”—and I believe that’s the most important message for all of us.
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